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Allan  Meltzer’s  A  History  of  the  Federal  Reserve  1913-1951  Vol.  I  is  a  monumental 
accomplishment. The volume provides a very detailed history of the Fed in its formative years 
from its establishment in 1913 to the Federal Reserve Treasury Accord of 1951. The narrative 
covers the key events of four decades; getting started; war finance in World War I; the 1920-21 
recession;  the  boom  years  in  the  1920s;  the  Wall  Street  crash  and  the  Great  Depression; 
subservience  to  the  Treasury  beginning  in  1934;  World  War  II  finance  and  the  pegging  of 
interest rates; and the 1951 Accord when the Fed regained its independence from the Treasury. 
  In painstaking detail Meltzer documents how the Fed grew up to be an adult central bank 
and what a drawn out and rocky adolescence it suffered through. The narrative in Volume I sets 
the stage for the yet to be completed Volume II which covers the period from the Accord to the 
beginning of Alan Greenspan’s tenure as chairman - - the Federal Reserve’s far from tranquil 
adulthood. 
  The volume complements Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz’s A Monetary History of 
the United States: 1867-1960 published in 1963. However unlike their work, which is a monetary 
history of the United States, Meltzer’s book is a biography of its central bank, portrayed within 
the broader context of U.S. monetary history. More importantly, because Meltzer had access to a 
much more complete archived official record than they had (the records of the Federal Reserve 
Board, the Board of Governors and the minutes of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s 
board of directors as well as of the Federal Advisory Council), his interpretation of many of the 
key episodes in Fed history greatly expands upon and in several episodes, differs considerably   3 
from theirs. This is most evident in Volume I’s treatment of the Fed’s policy failure in the 1920s 
and 1930s that culminated in the debacle of the Great Depression. Indeed his chapters four and 
five are the signature chapters in the book, as of course is chapter seven The Great Contraction, 
1929-1933 in Friedman and Schwartz. They are essential reading for any serious student of that 
disaster. 
      Section 2 of my essay discusses what I distill to be the seven major themes in History 
of  Federal  Reserve.  A  History  is  an  excellent  source  for  any  serious  student  of  the  Federal 
Reserve. It is also very detailed and a time consuming read. Appendix I offers a succinct Readers 
Guide to the Historical Narrative in Volume I.  Section 3 concludes with some critical insights.  
 
2. Major Themes 
 
  Seven major themes knit the historical narrative together and are the essence of Meltzer’s 
thesis: (1) the Fed followed the wrong model from the beginning and never really got it right 
even by 1951; (2) as in Friedman and Schwartz, the structure of the Federal Reserve was flawed 
from the beginning and contributed greatly to its inability to learn; (3) in distinction to Friedman 
and Schwartz, the effects of adhering to a flawed policy model outweighed the contribution of 
bright officials, even Benjamin Strong, who may have known better; (4) the interpretation of the 
Great  Depression  by  Friedman  and  Schwartz    and  other  scholars  such  as  Bernanke  and 
Eichengreen is wanting; (5) economic forces in the rest of the world are important and the Fed 
had ongoing problems coming to grips with them; (6) the Fed had a long and protracted struggle 
in maintaining its independence from the Treasury; (7) Meltzer views the history of the Fed 
through monetarist glasses.    4 
2.1. The Fed followed the Wrong Model 
A theme that determines Meltzer’s interpretation of Federal Reserve history is that from 
its very outset the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, was based on two precepts: the real bills doctrine 
and the gold standard. These precepts led it on many occasions to follow policies that were 
detrimental for the U.S. economy. The same point was made by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) 
and West (1979), but Meltzer takes it much further. His analysis (to be developed further in 
Appendix I) starts with the problems that the Fed had in operating monetary policy.  
Policy in the post-1914 environment was supposed to maintain gold convertibility by the 
passive rediscounting of self liquidating real (commercial) bills and use of the discount rate, to 
counter movements in the gold reserve ratio. In response to the changing environment (World 
War  I  and  its  aftermath)  and  especially  heavy  Congressional  criticism  of  its  performance 
following the severe recession of 1920-21, the Fed shifted to a more activist stance based more 
on the use of open market operations rather than discount policy and a new policy framework 
which Meltzer calls the Burgess - Riefler doctrine.
1 According to this doctrine; which was an 
adaptation of real bills, member banks would apply to the discount window only in time of need 
and  not  for  profit,  and  the  Fed  could  induce  member  banks  to  borrow  to  repay  loans  by 
conducting  open  market  purchases  or  sales  of  government  securities.  According  to  Burgess-
Riefler the level of member banks indebtedness in the key reserve districts of New York and 
Chicago, and the level of short-term nominal interest rates, would indicate whether monetary 
ease or tightening was in order.  
Throughout the book Meltzer effectively demonstrates that by following this doctrine, the 
system  seriously  misjudged  policy.  Thus  it  viewed  low  member  bank  indebtedness  and  low 
                                                 
1 The role of the doctrine in Fed policy making was first developed by Wicker (1966, 1967) and then expanded upon 
by Brunner and Meltzer (1968).They referred to it as the Burgess-Riefler-Strong doctrine. It is a bit puzzling why 
Meltzer dropped Strong’s name from the doctrine in his latest work.    5 
nominal interest rates from 1930-33 as evidence of monetary ease, thereby creating the Great 
Depression, the recession of 1937-38 and other less spectacular failures.  
Meltzer goes further in his indictment of the Fed. In chapter 2 he masterfully reminds us 
that Henry Thornton in Paper Credit (1802) had already worked out the proper role of central 
bank policy under both gold and inconvertible paper money standards which was to use the 
discount rate to maintain price stability. Moreover, Walter Bagehot in Lombard Street (1870) 
gave central banks the precepts they needed to act as lenders of last resort to maintain financial 
stability and Irving Fisher in The Theory of Interest (1930) explained the distinction between 
nominal and real interest rates.  
According to Meltzer, had the Fed followed the lessons of monetary orthodoxy which 
had been well developed in the century before its establishment, it would not have made the 
mistakes that it did.        
  
2.2. The Structure of the Federal Reserve 
 
Meltzer argues throughout the narrative, similar to a theme in Friedman and Schwartz, 
that the structure of the Federal Reserve System, as delineated in the Federal Reserve Act of 
1913, created the conditions for continuous conflict between the 12 regional Federal Reserve 
banks and the Federal Reserve Board in Washington D.C. The framers of the Federal Reserve 
had to balance the interests of the northeast financial centers that wanted a European type central 
bank to manage the gold standard, with those of the interior that feared the centralization of 
economic  power  and  wanted  an  institution  responsive  to  local  credit  market  conditions, 
smoothing seasonal stresses on interest rates and incorporating the lender of last resort reserve   6 
pooling feature of the National Reserve Associations under the Aldrich Vreeland Act of 1908. 
The Federal Reserve System compromise established 12 regional Reserve banks (largely owned 
by, and whose governors (later presidents) were appointed by the member commercial banks, 
with the power to regulate local credit conditions by discounting eligible commercial bills) and 
the Federal Reserve Board in Washington D.C. (composed of government appointed officials 
who were to oversee and coordinate the operations of the system as a whole). 
The structural flaws emphasized by Meltzer were based on the incentive incompatibility 
of the two institutions within the Fed. The Reserve banks had an incentive to focus on local 
business and credit conditions with limited regard to the national economy. The Board, which 
was supposed to act in the national interest, did not have the power to compel the Reserve Banks 
to follow a uniform national policy. Moreover according to Meltzer, there were few individuals 
at the Board who had the ability to see the big picture clearly. Consequently, the early years of 
the system were characterized by a lack of national symmetry in Reserve bank discount rate 
policy as well as conflict between the Board and the Reserve banks in the setting of discount 
rates.  Some  of  the  early  dissidence  was  resolved  by  creation  in  1923  of  the  Open  Market 
Investment Committee (OMIC) to oversee national open market policy. 
The power vacuum was filled by Benjamin Strong, Governor of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York. Strong, with a superior intellect, extensive experience as an international 
banker,  and  great  force of character, headed the influential OMIC. He was  able to  gain the 
support of the other Reserve banks. Strong’s vision of a powerful central bank located in the 
nation’s  financial  capital  and  setting  both  national  and  international  monetary  policy,  often 
differed from the perspective of the members of the Federal Reserve Board in Washington as 
well as from those of officials of the other Reserve banks. Strong’s views usually prevailed.    7 
Meltzer largely accepts the views of Chandler (1958) and Friedman and Schwartz, that 
following Strong’s lengthy illness and death in October 1928, the conflict reemerged. George 
Harrison, Strong’s successor at the New York Fed had neither the intellect nor the personality to 
follow Strong’s precedent. This surely was an important reason for the system’s inability to deal 
with the Depression which began in August 1929.  
Later in 1931, in congressional hearings on reform of the Federal Reserve Act, Adolph 
Miller, Strong’s principal opponent on the Board, blamed Strong’s ‘highhanded’ expansionary 
policies in the summer of 1927 to preserve Britain’s adherence to the gold standard,
2 for fueling 
the  Wall  Street  stock  market  boom  with  its  inevitable  crash  and  depression.  This view  was 
accepted by Carter Glass, Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee and one of the framers of 
the original Federal Reserve Act. It led to major reforms of the Federal Reserve System in 1933 
and 1935, which once and for all centralized power with the Board in Washington. However, as 
Meltzer underlines, after 1933 Franklin Roosevelt’s Treasury dominated monetary policy and it 
took until March 1951 for the Fed to become a fully functioning central bank.              
 
2.3. Individuals would not have saved the day 
An important theme in A History is the role of individuals in developing policy. Meltzer 
documents in detail the role of Federal Reserve officials in the events he describes. The key 
players  in  the  narrative  are:  Benjamin  Strong,  Adolph  Miller,  George  Harrison,  Henry 
Morgenthau, Marriner Eccles, and Allan Sproul.  
Friedman and Schwartz, following Chandler(1958) view Benjamin Strong as the hero of 
the early Federal Reserve years. They praise his actions in the 1920s as being largely responsible 
                                                 
2 Although at the time both the directors of the New York Fed and the Reserve Board (including Miller) approved 
the policy.    8 
for the ‘High Tide of the Federal Reserve.’ According to them he had a clear understanding of 
the central bank’s role in both domestic and international policy. On the domestic side he was 
responsible for unifying the System in the 1920s to conduct the correct counter cyclical open 
market policies to offset the recessions of 1923-24 and 1926-27.  
On the international side, he worked tirelessly with Montagu Norman, Governor of the 
Bank of England (and also later with Emile Moreau, Governor of the Banque de France and 
Hjalmar  Schacht,  Governor  of  the  Reichsbank)  to  stabilize  the  currencies  of  the  European 
belligerents in the early 1920’s, to restore general adherence to the gold exchange standard and 
to help the Bank of England in 1924 and especially in 1927 in its losing battle to restore and then 
maintain its gold parity. Finally they argue that it was Strong’s untimely death in October 1928 
that allowed the System to devolve into a state of paralysis that failed to prevent the banking 
panics of the 1930’s. Moreover they argue that, had he lived, he would have acted after the fall 
of  1929  to  continue  open  market  purchases  to  prevent  the  banking  panics  from  doing  their 
damage. 
Meltzer generally agrees with Friedman and Schwartz on Strong’s role in unifying the 
system in the 1920s, and in restoring the gold exchange standard, but he differs with them by 
also emphasizing some of his mistakes; particularly the failure to respond quickly enough to the 
inflation of 1919-20 after World War I and then the recession of 1921; the belief that monetary 
tightening was necessary to stem the Wall Street boom, and his focus on the same indicators that 
led the system to misjudge its policy from 1930 to 1933 and that he probably, but not definitely, 
would have led to the system to jettison the framework in time. 
Meltzer also is much more critical of George Harrison, Strong’s successor at the New 
York  Fed  than  are  Friedman  and  Schwartz.  They  view  him  as  not  having  the  leadership   9 
capabilities to do what Strong would have done but as basically being on the same page. Meltzer 
demonstrates time and again how Harrison either made incorrect judgments based on Burgess-
Riefler or delayed actions that had been agreed upon.  
Adolph Miller also gets mixed reviews by Meltzer. Although he was Strong’s fiercest 
opponent on the Board in the 1920s and a staunch advocate of real bills, he also pushed for the 
continuation of expansionary policy in 1932 while Harrison was opposed.    
After the Great Depression, Marriner Eccles became chairman of the greatly strengthened 
Board of Governors in 1934. He generally gets low marks as an avid believer in the impotence of 
monetary policy “as pushing on a string” and the existence of a liquidity trap, for advocating the 
doubling of reserve requirements in 1936-37 out of fear of future inflation to sop up commercial 
banks’ excess reserves, and as passively accepting Treasury domination of the Fed, although by 
1949 he effectively joined the fight to regain the Fed’s independence. 
Henry Morgenthau Jr., Secretary of the Treasury from 1934 to 1945 generally gets very 
high  marks  for  having  the  Treasury  follow  an  expansionary  gold  purchase  program,  for 
devaluing the dollar and creating a gold-induced reflation (as well as threatening the Fed for 
being contractionary with the stick of open market purchases to be conducted by the Treasury’s 
Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF)) that pulled the U.S. out of the depression - - effectively 
doing what the Fed wouldn’t do. 
  Finally Allan Sproul, appointed President of the New York Fed in 1940, is given the 
highest marks for consistently and coherently making the case for ending the interest rate peg in 
the late 1940’s and restoring Federal Reserve independence.    10 
  Many other characters slip in and out of the narrative and are generally dismissed as 
ineffective  advocates  of  real  bills  and  other  sins.  Two  of  the  most  reviled  were  Governors 
MacDougal of Chicago and Young of Boston.  
 
2.4. A Reinterpretation of the Great Depression 
 
  A key feature of A History is the treatment of the Great Depression. Meltzer agrees with 
Friedman and Schwartz and others (Hamilton 1987) that the Great Depression was caused by 
monetary forces - -  the pursuit by the Fed of tight money in 1928-29 to stem the stock market 
boom and the failure to offset the banking panics of 1930-33 by  expansionary  open market 
policy. The key difference between his treatment and that of Friedman and Schwartz is in the 
reason why the Fed was at the center of the forces creating the depression. As discussed above, 
he  attributes  it  primarily  to  the  Fed’s  adherence  to  the  Burgess-Riefler  doctrine  and  more 
fundamentally real bills. According to Meltzer (and also Friedman and Schwartz), the Fed in the 
late 1920s was obsessed with the U.S. stock market because an important element of the real 
bills doctrine stated that the central bank should not accommodate lending to finance speculation 
in asset markets. That would fuel asset price inflation which would inevitably spill over into 
general inflation and inevitably lead to deflation and depression. Hence all the players in the 
system, including Strong, sought to deflate the boom, although he and the New York Fed wanted 
to do it by raising the discount rate, and the Board which favored regulating restrictions on 
member bank lending. 
  Once the crash occurred, and after a brief period in the fall in 1929 when the New York 
Fed, with the permission of the Board, followed an expansionary lender of last resort policy, the   11 
system reverted to a neutral to tight policy based on its readings of the indicators of the Burgess-
Riefler  doctrine  as  signifying  monetary  ease,  i.e.  member  bank  borrowing  was  low  as  were 
nominal interest rates.  
The Fed’s policy, according to Meltzer in A History Vol. I, Brunner and Meltzer (1968) 
and Wheelock (1992), was perfectly consistent with that followed in the earlier recessions of 
1923-24 and 1926-27. The only difference was that member bank borrowing was low because of 
the depression, and nominal rates were low reflecting expectations of deflation. In contrast to 
Friedman and Schwartz, who view the 1930-33 episode as a departure from the sound policies of 
the 1920’s, Meltzer et al view the Fed’s policy as consistent between the 20s and the 30s. The 
only difference was that economic conditions had changed but were not taken into account by 
Fed officials. Hence Meltzer is less sanguine than Friedman and Schwartz that, had Strong lived 
he would have saved the day. Moreover he posits that all of the members of the OMPC (Open 
Market Policy Committee, the successor to the OMIC) who set policy in 1930-33 following the 
Burgess-Riefler doctrine, had also done so several years earlier. Meltzer agrees with Friedman 
and  Schwartz  on  the  importance  of  the  flawed  structure  of  the  Fed,  but  emphasized  that  it 
increased  the  difficulty  of  developing  the  consensus  that  would  have  produced  the  required 
change in policy.
3           
 
                                                 
3 Meltzer also expresses considerable differences with Bernanke’s (1983) view of the banking panics as a non-
monetary event, identifying the key channel separate from the effects of a decline in money supply, by which the 
banking crisis impacted the real economy as the rise in the cost of credit intermediation to small firms. Meltzer 
(pp.313-314, 396) argues that commercial paper declined much more than bank lending to small firms and that the 
decline in bank lending to small firms most likely reflected a response to a decline in the demand for loans as 
borrowers incomes fell. He expresses similar reservations to the related approach by Calomiris (1993).    12 
2.5. The Rest of the World 
 
  The gold standard was one of the two pillars of the Federal Reserve Act and Federal 
Reserve officials paid considerable attention to it over much of the period covered in volume I. 
According to the rules of the gold standard, the monetary authority was supposed to define the 
value of its currency in terms of a fixed weight of gold and then maintain the gold peg by freely 
buying or selling gold coins or bullion. The gold standard embodied an automatic adjustment 
mechanism whereby shocks to the balance of payments would be accommodated by gold and 
short-term capital flows and domestic money supply; interest rates, prices and output would 
adjust. Monetary authorities were supposed to follow the ‘rules of the game’ and raise and lower 
their discount rates to speed up the adjustment mechanism. They were supposed to subsume 
domestic policy objectives to maintain external convertibility but over short periods of time, they 
could engage in the temporary smoothing of real output and interest rate shocks.
4  
When the Fed was established it was supposed to follow the ‘rules of the game’ in the 
way the Bank of England had done in the 1880-1914  period - - to alter the discount rate in 
reaction to changes in the gold reserve ratio. However, shortly after the Fed opened its doors, 
World War I led to the suspension of gold convertibility (de facto and de jure) in most countries. 
Hence the Fed did not have to worry much about external balance considerations for close to six 
years. From 1914 to 1917 massive gold inflows increased the gold reserve and led to inflation, 
but because the rest of the world was inflating even faster, and because convertibility had been 
suspended, the adjustment mechanism did not function. After hostilities ceased, inflation (now 
                                                 
4 Bordo and MacDonald (2004) show that under the pre 1914 classical gold standard because the core countries of 
Western Europe had considerable credibility, the gold points surrounding gold parity served as a ‘target zone’ in the 
sense of Krugman (1990) and Svensson (1993) in which central banks could temporarily pursue domestic 
objectives.   13 
paper money induced) increased, and by 1919, U.S. gold reserves began to decline. The Fed then 
began following the ‘rules’ and by dramatically raising the discount rate in 1920-21 produced a 
very serious deflation and recession. 
  The  NY  Fed  under  Benjamin  Strong’s  leadership  in  the  early  1920’s  was  then 
instrumental in restoring the gold standard, albeit a gold exchange standard with the dollar and 
the pound as the key currencies. The restored gold exchange standard did not work as effectively 
as the pre war version. Meltzer in Vol. I, following Meltzer (1976) has a brilliant treatment of its 
flaws.  According  to  him  the  system  had  two  fatal  flaws.  First,  real  exchange  rates  were 
misaligned, Britain went back to gold in 1925 at the pre war parity of $4.86 to the pound at an 
overvalued rate. France restored convertibility de facto in 1926 at a greatly undervalued parity 
(as  did  Germany  in  1924).  Secondly,  key  adherents  were  unwilling  to  allow  the  adjustment 
mechanism to work. France followed a pro-gold policy and sterilized its gold inflows. The Fed 
also sterilized gold inflows in the 1920’s because it feared inflation. As a consequence, gold 
flowed  continuously  to  the  U.S.  and  France  from  Britain  and  the  rest  of  the  world.  Britain 
suffered continuous deflationary pressure and lurched from crisis to crisis in which it threatened 
to leave the gold standard unless it was aided by rescue loans and coordinated policy responses 
by the U.S., France and Germany. 
  Meltzer documents how this maladaptive international monetary system contributed to 
monetary tightening in 1928-29 that led to the depression. After 1929, gold inflows to the U.S. 
continued imposing deflationary pressure across the world. 
  Eichengreen (1992), as well as Temin (1989) argued that the gold standard was the key 
cause of the Great Depression because member countries, locked into a gold standard mentality, 
were unwilling to leave it to end deflation and bank distress, and because their commitment to   14 
defend  convertibility  above  all  else  had  been  weakened  after  World  War  I  by  the  rise  of 
democracy and labor unions. Eichengreen argued that the U.S. like Belgium, the Netherlands and 
other countries could not follow expansionary monetary policy to end the depression for fear that 
gold  reserves  would  fall  below  the  statutory  minimum.  In  the  U.S.  case  he  focused  on  the 
problem of ‘free gold’ (“gold held by reserve banks that was not required as a reserve against 
outstanding base money” (Meltzer p. 335)), as a key reason why the Fed was reluctant to follow 
expansionary policy in 1930-33.  
Meltzer strongly disagrees with this position and effectively argues that except for several 
months between October 1931 after Britain left the gold standard, and February 1932 when the 
Glass Steagall Act allowed U.S. government securities to serve as eligible securities in the Fed’s 
balance sheets, free gold was not a problem. And even in those few months when the gold 
reserve  ratio  declined  to  50%  (10%  above  the  minimum)  that,  were  expansionary  policy 
followed and the gold reserve ratio threatened, the Federal Reserve Act allowed a temporary 
suspension of the gold cover ratio (which had actually been invoked in 1916), as well as other 
measures that could have been taken.
5  
  Meltzer is also highly skeptical of another claim by Eichengreen (1992), who argued 
following  Kindleberger  (1986),  that  absent  countries  leaving  the  gold  standard,  only 
internationally  coordinated  reflation  would  have  ended  the  depression.  Meltzer  argues  that 
coordination  would  work  only  if  it  were  consistent  with  the  self-interest  of  all  the  parties 
concerned which, as he documents, was not the case in the failure of policy coordination during 
the depression and in the Tripartite Agreement of 1936-39. The only really successful example 
                                                 
5 Bordo, Choudhri and Schwartz (2002)simulate a model of the U.S. as a large open economy with imperfect capital 
mobility, demonstrating that even in the worst case scenario in the late 1930’s, had expansionary open market 
operations been undertaken sufficient to correct the downturn, that gold reserves would not have reached the 
statutory minimum. Hsieh and Romer (2001) corroborate this conclusion.    15 
of policy coordination on record was that engineered by Benjamin Strong to save sterling in 
1927.  
More importantly, Meltzer disagrees with the basic thesis put forward by Eichengreen 
and other proponents of the revisionist international interpretation of the Great Depression. He 
convincingly argues that, the gold standard per se was not the basic problem. It was rather the 
fact that the interwar gold standard was based on misaligned real exchange rates and that the key 
members did not allow the gold standard adjustment mechanism to work. 
  After  World  War  II,  the  U.S.  was  instrumental  in  establishing  the  Bretton  Woods 
International  Monetary  System.  The  adjustable  peg  exchange  rate  arrangement,  whereby 
countries  pegged  their  currencies  to  the  dollar  (but  could  alter  the  peg  under  conditions  of 
fundamental  disequilibrium)  and  the  dollar  was  pegged  to  gold  at  $35.00  per  ounce,  was  a 
compromise between the interwar gold standard and floating. The U.S. negotiations over Bretton 
Woods were carried out by the U.S. Treasury with the Federal Reserve Board playing only a 
minor role. Meltzer documents the dispute between John Williams of the New York Fed, who 
wanted to restore a key currency arrangement based on gold as had existed under the Tripartite 
Agreement, and the Board, which supported the Treasury. As it turned out the Bretton Woods 
System  evolved  into  a  key  currency  gold  dollar  standard  very  close  to  that  envisioned  by 
Williams. Regardless, in the early years covered in Vol I, the U.S. had massive gold reserves and 
external balance considerations had virtually no the influence on monetary policy.  
   16 
2.6. The Fed’s Struggle for Independence 
 
  A theme running through A History is the Fed’s struggle to maintain independence from 
the  Treasury.  The  Federal  Reserve  Act  gave  the  institution  a  considerable  amount  of 
independence from the fiscal authority. The Reserve banks could set their discount rates based 
on the demands by member banks to discount eligible paper. Government securities were not 
included in eligible paper and so the Fed was from the beginning, not supposed to be a central 
bank to finance short-run government revenue shortfalls, as were the Bank of England and the 
First and Second Bank of the United States. However, the Fed was not completely independent, 
the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller of the Currency were members of the Board.  
  World War I changed the picture considerably. The system quickly became involved in 
war finance, absorbing short-term government securities at low pegged rates and marketing war 
bonds, and by 1917 became an engine of inflation. Once the war ended it took the Fed two years 
to regain its independence during which it fueled two more years of inflation. Although Fed 
officials became concerned in 1919 about the runup in inflation, they were unable to act without 
Treasury compliance. The Treasury wanted to keep rates low and bond prices high to protect the 
commercial banks, which had absorbed its debt. As a consequence, the Fed had to wait to raise 
interest rates beginning in late 1919, until the Treasury had completed its funding of the war 
debt, to stem inflationary pressures. It then waited too long to reduce rates in 1921 once a serious 
recession had set in. Meltzer, like Friedman and Schwartz, views this episode as the Fed’s first 
serious policy error.  
In the 1920’s the Fed did conduct independent monetary policy. As discussed in section 
2.1  above  policy  was  based  on  the  Burgess-Riefler  doctrine.  Meltzer,  like  Friedman  and   17 
Schwartz, gives it high  marks for the mid 20’s. But then its flawed perception of the stock 
market boom, helped trigger the downturn and crash of 1929. Disaster followed in the next three 
years because of the Fed’s mistaken reliance on the Burgess-Riefler doctrine.  
  The  Bank  Acts  of  1933  and  1935  in  theory  solidified  the  Fed’s  independence  by 
removing the Secretary of Treasury from the Board and centralizing control in the new Board of 
Governors. However, as Meltzer points out, although the Fed in theory had the trappings of a 
powerful  independent  central  bank  (‘independent  within  government’),  in  practice  it  was 
subservient to Treasury gold policy and low interest rate policy over the next 18 years. 
  In a fascinating discussion developed in section 3.6 below Meltzer then documents the 
drawn out process beginning after World War II by which the Fed regained its independence, 
removed the interest rate peg, and began to use once again the instruments of monetary policy 
developed in the 1920’s. 
2.7. A History and Monetarism 
  Allan Meltzer was one of the pioneers of monetarism - - he and Karl Brunner along with 
Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz defined the school from the late 1950’s to the present. A 
History Vol. I is based on the monetarist model of the macro economy: that monetary forces 
determine nominal income, that money is neutral in the long run, that changes in money induce 
changes in real output in the short-run; and that the demand for money is stable.
6    
  Meltzer in A History expands on Friedman and Schwartz. Their earlier book (1963) was 
based on the theoretical framework in Friedman’s “Modern Quantity Theory of Money” (MQT) 
(1956) although no formal model was present in A Monetary History of the United States: 1867-
1960.  However  Friedman  and  Schwartz  organized  their  analysis  of  history  in  terms  of  the 
                                                 
6 Other propositions are: the distinction between nominal and real interest rates; the absence of a long-run Phillips 
curve trade off; and preference for monetary rules over discretion.    18 
categories  of  the  equation  of  exchange.  And  they  decomposed  the  money  supply  into  its 
proximate determinants to isolate the different forces affecting money supply. Their narrative 
was written to provide historical evidence for the MQT, to show that regardless of institutional 
arrangements  the  money  income  relationship  held  up.  To  do  this,  Friedman  and  Schwartz 
developed what later Romer and Romer (1989) and Lucas (1993) and Miron (1993) called the 
narrative approach - - to isolate historical episodes when changes in money could be identified as 
exogenous and hence have a causal influence on spending, output and prices. 
  Meltzer takes this framework as given. Like Friedman and Schwartz he does not write 
down an  explicit model. However he does  amplify their framework in  some very important 
ways. Rather than focusing on the proximate determinants of the money supply, (for which he 
criticized them in his review of their book (1964)) he emphasizes the relationship between the 
real monetary base and the behavior of real output. In a number of business cycle episodes he 
compares the growth rate of the real base to subsequent changes in real output. He then compares 
movements in real base growth to movements in the ex post short-term real interest rate - - to 
capture  the  effects  of  the  policy  variable  (the  short-term  nominal  interest  rate)  that  non 
monetarists of various stripes and Fed officials have always focused on. 
  Meltzer also continuously distinguished between nominal and real interest rates, which, 
as he points out in Volume I, Fed officials never were aware of. Finally he frequently spells out 
the  transmission  mechanism  from  Brunner  and  Meltzer  (1993),  whereby  changes  in  money 
supply impinge on a portfolio of assets ranging from money to government and corporate bonds 
to equity. Using this analysis he shows quite convincingly that, in virtually every significant 
recession and recovery episode in the four decades covered in Volume I, movements in the real 
base dominate movements in real interest rates in the relationship with real growth. This he   19 
argues reflects the operation of the real balance effect. On only one occasion, 1931-33 do real 
interest rates outperform the real base and that is because in that episode the base fell faster than 
prices.  Moreover  he  also  demonstrates  that,  in two  deflationary  recession  episodes in  which 
nominal  interest  rates  were  very  close  to  the  zero  nominal  bound  (1937-38  and  1948-49), 
declining prices, by inducing a positive real balance effect led to recovery - - evidence against 
the existence of a liquidity trap.         
   
3. Critique 
 
  I have some differences with Meltzer on a number of issues raised by vol. I. 
  My main concern is with chapter 2 on the history of doctrine. Although it is an extremely 
tight exegesis on the origins of classical monetary doctrine in the tradition of Jacob Viner’s 
Studies in the Theory of International Trade (1937), chapter 2 doesn’t quite fit with the rest of 
the volume. Its location at the beginning of the book sets the stage for Meltzer’s key theme in the 
following historical narrative chapters namely, that the Fed followed the wrong model from the 
beginning and that the right model had been worked out a century earlier by Henry Thornton. 
The chapter doesn’t really tell us why the Fed did worse than other central banks - - all of whom 
had forgotten Thornton by 1914. 
  I would have preferred if chapter 2 primarily covered the history of the U.S. experience 
in the century preceding the establishment of the Fed, with and without central banks, beginning 
with the First Bank of the United States founded in 1791. Had Allan Meltzer done that, he would 
have had better insights as to why the Fed had such a flat (and tortured) learning curve. My 
thesis (expressed earlier by Redlich (1957), Hammond (1958), and Timberlake (1978)) is that   20 
populism in the U.S., and the fear of concentration of economic power in anything like the Bank 
of England (dating from 1694), made U.S. monetary history very different from that of the other 
advanced countries. Both the First and later the Second Bank of the United States, designed by 
Alexander Hamilton, were brilliant models for their time of proto-central banks. Their charters 
were terminated because of populism and the fear of concentrated economic power. The Second 
Bank of the United States under Nicholas Biddle was developed into a first rate central bank. 
According to Redlich (1957), Biddle had read his Thornton and was concerned with exactly the 
macro relationships (between money, interest rate, prices, exchange rates and the balance of 
payments) that Meltzer accuses Fed officials of having forgotten. Biddle had a remarkably clear 
understanding of the role of the Bank in stabilizing foreign exchange rates, smoothing seasonal 
and cyclical shocks, and acting as a lender of last resort. In many respects he was ahead of his 
contemporaries at the Bank of England. 
  Indeed, had the Second Bank not been destroyed by Andrew Jackson, U.S. monetary 
history would have been very different (also see Hammond (1958)). The Second Bank would 
have evolved like the major European central banks of the nineteenth century which all followed 
the rules of the gold standard, learned Bagehot’s rule and believed in real bills. 
  My counterfactual hypothesis of what the world would have been like had Jackson not 
destroyed the Second Bank plays out like this. Had the Second Bank survived, Free Banking 
would not have been a problem (it would have probably appeared because something like it (the 
country  banks) developed in England). The Civil War would have been financed in a more 
efficient  way  (probably  just  by  the  issue  of  greenbacks  plus  Federal  bond  issues  and  tax 
increases but not by the issue of national bank notes), indeed the National Banking system would 
likely not have been created because the Second Bank would have learned to deal with the   21 
problem of banking panics and the seasonal patterns of short term interest rates. Moreover a 
unified money market that Biddle helped create (Knodell 2001) would have developed more 
rapidly than it did, allowing better regional risk diversification. Possibly (interregional) branch 
banking would have developed under a strong Bank. Had the financial crisis problem been dealt 
with, as was the case in England in 1866, the U.S. central bank would likely not have behaved as 
it did in 1930-1933. 
  Moreover, the Second Bank would have learned to play by ‘the rules of the gold standard 
game’  as  most  European  central  banks  had  done.  It  still  would  have  followed  the real  bills 
doctrine,  which  was  the  prevailing  theory  of  banking  in  all  countries  in  the  late  nineteenth 
century. World War I would have been financed in the way it was and the gold standard would 
have been suspended by the U.S., as was the case in the Civil War. An embargo on gold exports 
would  have  been  imposed.  The  postwar  instability  in  Europe  would  not  have  been  much 
different,  nor  would  be  the  real  exchange  rate  misalignment.  Had  the  U.S.  central  bank 
incorporated monetary orthodoxy in the nineteenth century, as the European central banks had 
done,  it  also  may  have  not  sterilized  gold  inflows  in  the  1920’s.  But  given  these  external 
parameters, a long-established U.S. central bank, similar to the Bank of England, the Reichsbank 
or the Banque de France would likely have learned to deal with its counterparts as equals without 
raising suspicions in Washington as Strong did (although one could argue as did Chandler (1958) 
that one couldn’t improve much on Benjamin Strong’s leadership).  
  Instead of this scenario, what the U.S. wrought before the Civil war was Free Banking, 
frequent financial crises, and an inefficient payments system. Then the National Banking System 
was established with a uniform national convertible currency but frequent crises and no effective 
lender of last resort. That environment led to the creation of the Fed primarily to deal with the   22 
inelasticity of high-powered money (Friedman and Schwartz 1963) and financial crises and also 
to observe the rules of the gold standard. The Fed was backward looking. It was set up in the 
twentieth century to deal with nineteenth century problems that the European central banks had 
long worked out.  
  Moreover, as Meltzer makes very clear, Wilson’s compromise in 1913 insured that the 
System wouldn’t work because the regional Reserve banks were designed to deal with nineteenth 
century problems using nineteenth century tools, and the Board was not given the power to 
conduct real monetary policy. It was a pleasant accident of history that Benjamin Strong became 
the  governor  of  the  New  York  Fed  and  was  able  to  temporarily  set  up  a  real  central  bank. 
Unfortunately he died too soon. 
  My main point is that an understanding of the path dependency of history would have 
been useful to help us understand how the structural flaws of the early Fed came about and how 
structure interacted with the real bills doctrine to produce the big mistakes of the early decades 
and also the Fed’s tardiness in learning from them. Other central banks did not mess up in the 
way the Fed did in the 1920s and 1930s (except maybe the Banque de France) and they were hit 
by equally big shocks.  
Counter to my Second Bank counterfactual, one could argue that deep-seated American 
populism and distrust of economic power would have eventually terminated the Second Bank 
even  if  the  Bank  War  between  Andrew  Jackson  and  Nicholas  Biddle  had  not  happened.  A 
possible response to this objection is that, as was the case with the Bank of England in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the Federal Reserve in the twentieth century, the U.S. 
central bank would have learned some self protective skills to create a constituency in the nation 
and especially in the Congress, to ward off incipient threats to its charter. This would suggest   23 
that the Biddle /Jackson war was sui generis, reflecting a head on collision of two egomaniacs, 
and that it would not necessarily have repeated itself. 
  Regardless of the outcome, the point of my exercise is to demonstrate the importance of 
path dependency. The legacy of the destruction of the Second Bank and the victory of populism 
in the nineteenth century, led to eight decades of monetary disarray. This was the background to 
Wilson’s compromise and the slow and painful learning process for the Federal Reserve which 
followed. 
  Meltzer critiques Fed officials for failing to remember Thornton, Bagehot and Fisher. 
Which central bank in the pre 1950 period did remember their doctrine? The Bank of England 
and the other central banks knew Bagehot, although the other countries usually solved banking 
crises with government bailouts and didn’t worry about the liquidity/solvency distinction. They 
also observed the rules of the game (again the Bank of England much more than others). But few 
central banks had the open economy quantity framework embedded in Thornton in their psyche. 
Moreover  the  economics  profession  in  the  interwar  also  wasn’t  completely  clear  on  how 
monetary policy should be conducted. Thus although Thornton may have had the right model in 
1802, most economists in the U.S. and abroad (with some exceptions like Fisher, Hawtrey and 
Keynes) had forgotten it or never learned it. This then leaves us with the question, suppose the 
Fed officials had the Thornton model in mind but the structure established in 1913, and the 
legacy of nineteenth century monetary disarray been the same, would the Fed have avoided its 
big mistakes? I am skeptical.  
  My last comment is a minor quibble. The book is a very dense read. It meticulously 
documents every detail of the record. It contains many useful figures and tables to help the 
reader and a detailed analysis of who said what is then usefully summarized by the author. What   24 
the book lacks is a detailed table of contents at the beginning and a list of figures and tables (only 
chapter titles are listed in the contents).  These items would have made it much easier for the 




  Allan Meltzer’s A History of the Federal Reserve Volume I is a major addition to the 
literatures on monetary history and monetary policy. It is on par with the classic histories of the 
Bank of England by Clapham (1945) and Sayers (1976). Any serious scholar of the Federal 
Reserve  will  have  to  have  this  book  in  his  collection.  We  eagerly  await  the  publication  of 
Volume II.      25 
Appendix I. A Reader’s Guide to the Historical Narrative 
 
In this Appendix, I develop in more detail the narratives in the five central chapters of the 
book. My discussion follows chronologically the treatment in Volume I. 
 
3.1 Doctrinal Antecedents 
 
Chapter 2 in A History develops the doctrinal antecedents to the Federal Reserve Act in 
the British literature on monetary theory and policy in the nineteenth century. Meltzer argues that 
the basic theoretical precepts behind the Act - - the gold standard and the real bills doctrine - - 
were also those that guided the Bank of England in the nineteenth century. 
He begins with Henry Thornton’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Effect of the Paper 
Credit of Great Britain (1802) written during the Napoleonic war suspension period (1797-1821), 
when the Bank of England suspended gold convertibility and aided the government war finance 
efforts by freely discounting short-term government securities and commercial bills and issuing 
inconvertible bank notes. The resulting inflation led to the famous Bullionist debate between 
those who attributed the inflation to the Bank of England’s note issue (the Bullionists) and those 
who attributed it to real forces such as harvest failures and remittances to the continent (the Anti 
Bullionists). 
   Thornton is generally acknowledged to have had the clearest vision of the relationship 
between Bank of England policies, the price level, real output, interest rates (nominal versus 
real), exchange rates and the balance of payments (Fetter (1963), Viner (1937), Wood (1939)). 
According to Meltzer p. 20, Thornton combined the theory of central bank policy actions with   26 
the operation of the open economy quantity theory of money. He distinguished between the 
effects of policy actions under fixed and flexible exchange rates. Under the fixed exchange rate 
gold standard, the Bank of England’s note issue was determined by its gold reserve, which in 
turn depended on the balance of payments, which in turn depended on the relationship between 
the price level in England and the rest of the world.  
Thornton  understood  that  an  issue  of  Bank  of  England  notes  would  ultimately  be 
displaced by a decline in gold reserves but that in the short run, the increase in the money supply 
would temporarily reduce short-term (real) interest rates, stimulate output, lead to a rise in the 
price level, an improvement in the terms of trade, a balance of trade deficit, a gold outflow, and 
then a decline in the Bank’s gold reserves. Under an inconvertible paper money regime, Bank of 
England note issue would lead to rising prices, a depreciating exchange rate and, once inflation 
was anticipated, to a departure of nominal from real interest rates, presaging Fisher’s (1896) 
famous distinction between real and nominal interest rates. According to Meltzer, Thornton also 
distinguished between money and credit, had a theory of velocity but above all, understood the 
distinction between long-run equilibrium and the short-run transmission mechanism. Moreover, 
Thornton  disputed  many  of  the  propositions  of  the  anti-Bullionists  (later  the  real  bills 
proponents) that money was passively determined by aggregate demand. Finally he had a good 
understanding of the basic rule to be followed by a central bank acting as a lender of last resort - 
- to lend freely to the money market (Humphrey 1975).  
In Meltzer’s view (page 63), the state of British monetary thinking deteriorated  after 
Thornton. Ricardo and his followers, focused on long-run equilibrium and comparative statics 
ignoring the transmission mechanism, a development which gave only limited guidance to the 
Bank  directors  concerned  with  short-run  disturbances  to  the  money  market.  The  subsequent   27 
Currency school / Banking school debate in the 1820’s/1830’s led to the development of the 
currency principle under which the Bank would vary its note issue directly with its gold reserves. 
The Banking school criticized the currency principle for neglecting the fact that bank deposits 
were also part of the money supply and for not accounting for movements in velocity (Viner 
1937). The Currency school also advocated the case for rules over the discretion of even well 
meaning and knowledgeable Bank directors. 
Meltzer (pp.37-39) follows Viner (1937) and others in discussing the problems of the 
implementation of the currency principle embodied in Palmer’s Rule (1827), under which the 
Bank would keep a fixed percentage of its portfolio in gold and then allow the note issue to vary 
with gold flows. The resulting financial turbulence of the 1830’s and 1840’s (panics in 1837 and 
1847), which reflected the neglect by the rule of the shocks emanating from and impacting on the 
commercial banking system, and of shifts in velocity, led to a compromise between the two 
schools and a mix between rules and discretion manifest in the Bank Charter Act of 1844. The 
Act divided the Bank into the Issue Department based on the currency principle and the Banking 
Department  under  which  the  Bank  of  England  followed  normal  banking  business  (taking 
deposits, portfolio management) and developed its discount rate policy. 
In the rest of the nineteenth century, the Banking school became the key influence over 
the Bank’s policy view. The Bank’s directors focused on changes in the discount rate (Bank rate) 
to influence short-term interest rates, short-term capital flows and its gold reserve. The real bills 
doctrine came from this tradition (Meltzer p. 43). According to it, as long as the Bank only 
discounted real commercial bills and satisfied the ‘needs of trade’, there would never be an over 
issue of money and credit.    28 
Financial crises (aka banking panics), which were a perennial problem in England before 
1866 (see Schwartz 1986) were believed to be caused by real shocks. The solution to them, 
worked  out  by  Walter  Bagehot  in  Lombard  Street  (1870)  was  for  the  Bank  to  accept 
responsibility for the stability of the financial system (the Responsibility Doctrine) and to “lend 
freely but at a penalty rate.” 
The key theme in chapter 2 is that by the end of the nineteenth century, Banking school 
ideas motivated the Bank to focus on the state of the short-term money market and its gold 
reserves. The long-run influence of the effects of Bank rate policy on money supply, the real 
economy and the price level and the feedback to the Bank’s portfolio by the price-specie flow 
mechanism posited by Henry Thornton was ignored. The framers of the Federal Reserve System 
inherited this state of beliefs and embedded it in the 1913 Act. They did not adopt the quantity 
theoretic perspective and the adjustment mechanism worked out by Thornton or even the long-
run equilibrium perspective of Ricardo. These beliefs, according to Meltzer, lay at the heart of 
the system’s policy errors in its first four decades of existence. This theme runs through the 
remainder of the narrative.  
 
The Early Years 
 
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 was a compromise between proponents of a European 
central bank and those who feared the financial power of New York. According to Meltzer (p. 
67) President Wilson’s compromise led to 12 regional Reserve banks controlled by local bankers 
and the Federal Reserve Board approved by the government, with no clear division of power - - a 
portent of future problems.    29 
The Fed’s basic functions were to adhere to the gold standard and to provide an elastic 
currency. This would be achieved by discounting real commercial bills issued for the needs of 
trade  (lending  against  the  security  of  speculative  projects  or  government  securities  was 
prohibited). The Fed was also supposed to serve as a lender of last resort, smooth the seasonal in 
interest rates, facilitate par value check clearing, manage the payments system and other tasks. 
Lending on real bills under the  gold standard,  the Fed was designed to be a passive 
institution. As events turned out, it learned to be more active (Meltzer p. 73). World War I 
permanently changed the environment facing the nascent institution. In the three years before the 
U.S. entered the war the Fed monetized gold inflows from the belligerent nations and thereby 
fueled inflation. Benjamin Strong of the New York Fed quickly became the leading force in the 
system  and  played  a  key  role  in  galvanizing  it  into  action.  Although  there  were  frequent 
territorial skirmishes between the Board and the Reserve bank, they were minor compared to 
those  that  followed  later  in  the  1920’s  and  1930’s  and  Strong  often  diffused  them.  He  was 
instrumental  in  centralizing  open  market  operations  (p.77)  and  pooling  the  system’s  gold 
reserves. His intentions were to run the Fed like the Bank of England and to keep the discount 
rate above market rates as a penalty rate (p. 78). Once the U.S. entered the war the Fed quickly 
became subservient to the Treasury, abandoned the penalty rate, and began indirectly supporting 
Treasury  finance  by  setting  a  preferential  discount  rate  on  U.S.  Treasury  certificates  below 
market interest rates. This fueled inflation in a manner similar to the absolute interest rate pegs 
used in World War II (Meltzer p. 86). 
After  hostilities  ceased  in  November  1918  the  Fed  followed  the  Treasury’s  lead  in 
keeping interest rates low to preserve member banks’ balance sheets. This policy further fueled 
inflation. Beginning in the summer of 1919, after the Treasury in June lifted the embargo on gold   30 
exports, Fed officials, became concerned over a decline in the gold reserve ratio and began to 
discuss raising rates according to classical doctrine, However, no action was taken until after the 
Fed was released from Treasury control in December 1919, and in January 1920 the Fed began a 
series of hikes in the discount rate within a few months from below 5% to 7%. 
 Like Friedman and Schwartz, Meltzer criticizes the Fed for waiting too long to raise 
rates. Shortly after the rise in rates, the economy went into a severe recession and soon the gold 
reserve ratio began to decline, but Strong and other important Fed officials opposed cutting rates, 
because high member bank borrowing was perceived as a sign of ease (p.130). This decision 
revealed an ongoing conflict between the Fed’s external and internal goals. In Strong’s view the 
Fed had to roll back the inflation generated after 1917 by its bond-support policy. On real bills 
lines the financing of bank government bond purchases was deemed to be speculation. Strong 
believed  the  Treasury  and  not  the  Fed  to  be  responsible  for  the  inflation  and  the necessary 
deflation and recession that followed (p.128). His goal on gold standard lines was to restore the 
price level to its 1917 level (p. 111). 
Like  Friedman  and  Schwartz,  Meltzer  regards  this  episode  as  the  Fed’s  first  policy 
failure. Indeed he demonstrates that the recovery started a few months before the Fed reversed its 
tight money policy in June 1921. The recovery resulted  from deflation that raised real cash 
balances  and  stimulated  gold  inflows.  In  this  episode  rising  real  balances  outweighed  the 
negative effects of extraordinarily high real interest rates (p. 118). The Fed reversed policy only 
under the lash of political pressure from Congress. The criticism made Strong and others gun-shy 
of the British penalty rate model and led him (but not most other Fed officials) to abandon the 
simple precepts of the real bills doctrine and to develop a new policy framework (pp. 132-135).  
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The 1920’s 
 
After the debacle of 1920-21, the Fed gave up use of the discount rate as a penalty rate 
and  the  gold  reserve  ratio  as  a  policy  indicator.  Meltzer  carefully  analyzes  the  evolution  of 
Federal Reserve procedures developed in the Tenth Annual Report in 1923 that altered its stance 
from a passive institution to an activist one.  
Meltzer  in  earlier  work  with  Brunner  (1968)  treated  the  Burgess-Riefler  doctrine 
developed in the report and in key books by Riefler and Burgess as the theoretical rationale for 
this shift to an activist policy from the passive real bills approach underlying the Federal Act. It 
was also a rationale for the use of open market operations as the key policy tool. The Burgess-
Riefler  doctrine  argued  that  member  banks  were  reluctant  to  borrow  and  would  turn  to  the 
discount window only in time of need (i.e., when their reserves were deficient), and they would 
repay loans promptly. They would not borrow for profit. Hence open market operations could 
affect their decision to borrow or repay loans: purchases would lead to a lower discount rate and 
induce them to borrow and expand their credit; sales would lead to a high discount rate and 
induce banks to repay. 
This doctrine was compatible with real bills but it allowed the Fed to conduct an activist 
policy.  According  to  this  doctrine,  two  indicators  were  crucial  to  determine  whether  policy 
should be eased or tightened: the level of member banks indebtedness in the New York and 
Chicago Federal Reserve Districts (above $500 million defined high indebtedness; below $500 
million low indebtedness and the need for ease); and the level of short-term nominal interest 
rates (Meltzer p. 161).   32 
Although adherence to this rule of thumb led in part by chance to good outcomes in the 
recessions  of  1923-24  and  1926-27,  it  led  to  disaster  in  1929-1933  and  1937-38.  Meltzer 
throughout the rest of the narrative in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 criticizes the approach for its basic 
premise that member banks do not borrow for profit, for its assumption that the level of member 
bank borrowing is a good indicator of the state of the economy, for focusing on nominal and not 
real interest rates, because it was still embedded in real bills and its emphasis on the discounting 
of self-liquidating commercial bills only.  
A related development in the early and mid 1920 was the shift of power from the Board 
in Washington to Reserve banks and especially to the New York Fed under Benjamin Strong in 
the setting of Reserve bank’s policy by the Open Market Investment Committee. Strong was able 
to count on the support of the other Reserve Banks in part because he offered the Banks in the 
rural regions some assistance in meeting their required dividends payable to their member bank 
shareholders, by pooling the returns on the open market portfolio (Meltzer pp. 214-215). 
Strong  and  the  OMIC  were  proponents  of  the  Burgess-Riefler  doctrine  and  activist 
national open market policy to stabilize the business cycle. The Board, whose chief spokesman 
was Adolph Miller (the only Ph.D. economist on the Board), continued to be staunch advocates 
of the original real bills view.  In  a fascinating  discussion in chapter 4, Meltzer narrates the 
ongoing tennis match between Strong and Miller. The Reserve banks didn’t always win every 
match in the 1920s. One of the interesting episodes in which the Board successfully exerted its 
power  was  the  ‘Chicago  Rate  Controversy’  in  September  1927,  when  the  Chicago  Fed  was 
forced by the Board to reduce its discount rate in line with reductions by the other Reserve banks 
(Meltzer pp. 221-224). This episode illustrates an important theme in the book - - that in the 
1920’s and 1930’s ambiguous division of authority in the system weakened monetary control.     33 
The third development in the twenties was the restoration of the gold standard. Benjamin 
Strong  played  a  key  role  along  with  Montagu  Norman  in  the  international  cooperation  that 
allowed the major belligerents and many other countries to return to gold convertibility. Meltzer 
is highly complementary of Strong’s role in both aiding sterling’s return to the fold in 1925 and 
keeping it there in 1927. The famous meeting in Long Island in July 1927 between, Strong, 
Norman, Moreau and Schacht in which the Fed (along with the others) agreed to ease policy to 
offset pressure on sterling, Meltzer views as a unique event of cooperation which worked only 
because the interest of all parties concerned coincided (p. 177). 
The 1927 meeting was successful in dealing with the immediate pressure on the pound 
but ignored the basic long-term problems of the restored gold exchange standard: the misaligned 
real exchange rates and the fact that each country’s long-run objectives were incompatible with 
the basic framework of the international monetary system. For the U.S. the problem was that the 
Fed was unwilling to let the gold standard adjustment mechanism work and allow gold inflows 
to raise the price level and thereby lead to adjustment via the price specie flow mechanism. Fed 
officials  feared  that  inflation  would  inevitably  lead  to  deflation  so  the  system  continuously 
sterilized  gold  inflows,  thereby  putting  deflationary  pressure  on  the  rest  of  the  world.  As 
discussed  in  section  2  above,  France  followed  a  similar  deflationary  policy.  Meltzer  clearly 
points out the irony in the Fed’s policy. Because of fear of deflation they sterilized gold inflows 
(and ended the Wall Street boom), thereby producing the deflationary outcome they wished to 
prevent.   
The final theme in the 1920’s was the denouement of the struggle for power in the debate 
over the Wall Street boom. In 1927-28 the struggle between Miller and Strong (later Harrison, 
after Strong died) was over the use of the discount rate (Strong) and qualitative controls on bank   34 
loans that financed the stock market (Miller). Miller, an advocate of real bills, believed that the 
quality of credit mattered. He also feared a repeat of 1920-21 for which the Fed was heavily 
criticized. For Strong, on the other hand, credit was fungible. He wanted to restrict total credit 
and money.  
According to Meltzer (p. 265), all Fed officials because of their common belief that rising 
asset prices inevitably leads to inflation which inevitably leads to deflation (a view still held by 
the BIS), erred in believing that the Fed should deflate the stock market boom. Meltzer correctly 
points out that in addition to the difficulty of ascertaining whether an asset price boom reflects 
fundamentals or a bubble, the Fed focused (in 1929) rising interest rates on brokers loans as 
signaling inflationary pressure when at the same time the real monetary base, beginning in late 
1927, predicted an excess demand for money and deflation. 
Meltzer also documents Miller’s (1935) postmortem on the causes of the crash and the 
depression,  reprising  in  testimony  he  had  given  before  hearings  of  the  Senate  Banking 
Committee held in 1931. Miller blamed the New York Fed and Benjamin Strong in particular for 
adopting an expansionary policy in the summer of 1927 to save sterling. This policy (which 
Miller  signed  on  to  at  the  time),  fueled  the  stock  market  boom.  Then  because  Strong  and 
Harrison in both 1921 and 1929 opposed Miller’s qualitative approach to speculation, the boom 
got out of hand. The resulting crash caused the depression. The Board’s role, according to Miller 
was secondary. Its mistake was only its delay in taking leadership. The legislation in 1933 and 
1935 was evidence that Congress shared the Board’s view.  
In the end Meltzer (p. 265) gets back to his basic theme. Fed officials, sacrificed their 
longer-term  aims  to  satisfy  immediate  concerns  that  policy  was  highly  expansive  and 




Much of the discussion of Meltzer’s treatment of the Great Depression was covered in 
section 2 above. His main thesis is that the Depression came about because of a policy failure by 
the Federal Reserve based on its belief in the flawed Burgess-Riefler doctrine. In contrast to 
Friedman and Schwartz, he downplays both the importance of the structure of the system and 
Strong’s death. The narrative in chapter 5, which is an engrossing read, is well illustrated with a 
series of tables showing the information available to the OMPC (successor to the OMIC) at each 
meeting.  
According  to  Friedman  and  Schwartz  and  also  Meltzer  (p.  288),  the  New  York  Fed 
responded correctly to the stock market crash by expansionary open market purchases through 
the fall. The Board, the OMPC and the New York Fed were on the same page because the 
Burgess-Riefler indicators showed that member bank borrowing was high as were interest rates. 
The Board did differ with New York on how stimulus should be achieved. On real bills lines 
they preferred discounting over open market purchases. Once the pressure seemed to ease later in 
the fall, the case for open market purchases declined.  
Meltzer, (page 288), disagrees with Friedman and Schwartz on the interpretation of the 
episode.  They  argued  that  Harrison  of  New  York  pushed  for  continued  purchases  but  was 
discouraged  by  a  negative  response  from  the  Board.  According  to  Meltzer’s  reading  of  the 
Board’s minutes, which Friedman and Schwartz did not have access to, the Board agreed with 
Harrison’s case for large-scale purchases in October; their objection was New York’s decision to 
act alone.   36 
In the following months from November 1929 through the summer of 1930, as the U.S. 
economy sunk into recession, Meltzer carefully documents the system’s continued unwillingness 
to follow expansionary policy because member bank borrowing in New York was below $500 
million and market rates were low. Like Friedman and Schwartz, he argues (p. 279) that had the 
Fed focused on money supply, instead of interest rates, as its indicator of policy, they would not 
have considered that money was easy. Moreover, he points out on p. 310 that in September 1930, 
Miller of the Board was arguing for expansion while Harrison was opposed on the grounds that it 
would lead to inflation and gold outflows. Based on this evidence and also the views of Miller 
and others that Strong had precipitated the stock market boom by his policies to aid Britain in 
1927, as well as adherence by everyone in the System to the Burgess-Riefler doctrine, he doubts 
that had Strong lived he would have changed the course of events.  
The same theme follows in the narrative on the events of 1931, the crucial year of the 
contraction, with one new element - - events abroad. Like Wicker (1966), he argues (p. 330) that 
the Fed paid more attention to distress abroad than to the burgeoning banking crisis at home. In 
June 1931 Harrison arranged loans to assist Austria, Germany and Hungary. Later in August he 
expressed little interest in expansionary monetary policy because member banks borrowing was 
low and excess reserves were beginning to accumulate in the banking system - - evidence on 
Burgess-Riefler lines of ease.  
The classic blunder of the Great Contraction then followed after Britain left the gold 
standard in September 1931. The Fed reacted by raising the discount rate, ignoring its effect on 
the weakened banking system and justifying the move by Bagehot’s rule. According to Meltzer 
(p. 348), the Fed had forgotten the first half of the rule “to lend freely at a penalty rate”. Meltzer 
(p. 359) does not agree with the view that the Fed’s experiment with expansionary open market   37 
purchases in the spring of 1932, was largely an unwilling response to congressional pressure. 
According to him there was considerable support for it in the system because it was consistent 
with Burgess-Riefler indicators - - member bank borrowing and short-term nominal rates had not 
declined.  
Suspension  of  purchases  in  July  reflected  the  belief  that  the  policy  had  not  been 
successful; member bank borrowing and nominal rates had declined to the level of the previous 
year, and also concern over gold outflows. As discussed in section 2.5 above, Meltzer effectively 
disposes of Eichengreen’s argument, that indeed the Fed had to stop purchases because of the 
free gold problem. Meltzer, like Friedman and Schwartz, and Bordo, Choudhri and Schwartz 
(2003) argues that expansionary policy was successful and if it had continued would have led to 
a much more positive outcome. 
Meltzer’s  treatment  of  the  final  collapse  in  late  1932  and  early  1933  (pp.  374-389) 
leading to the Banking holiday of March 5, 1933 closely follows that of Friedman and Schwartz. 
He emphasizes the structural flaws that prevented the Reserve banks from cooperating to deal 
with the national crisis. 
In  the  end,  he  reiterates  the  theme  developed  in  chapter  2.  Had  Fed  officials  read 
Thornton, Bagehot and Fisher, none of the awful events of 1929-1933 would have transpired. 
Instead by following real bills and its offshoots, they focused on the wrong indicators of policy. 
Once  the  depression  began,  they  then  failed  to  follow  through  with  the  well-known  and 
appropriate policies developed by these great economists.     
 
 




In  the  period  following  the  Banking  holiday  of  March  1933,  the  Federal  Reserve’s 
fortunes changed significantly. In chapter 6, Meltzer considers the changes in structure of the 
Fed following the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935; the shift in control of monetary policy from 
the Fed to the Treasury under Secretary Henry Morgenthau; the major policy mistake in 1936-37 
of doubling reserve requirements; and the major changes in international economic policy under 
the direction of the Treasury.  
Congress  blamed  the  financial  system  and  the  Federal  Reserve  for  the  crash  and  the 
depression. It attributed speculative excesses leading to the crash to the interconnection between 
commercial and investment banking. This led to separation of the two under the Glass Steagall 
Act  of  1933.  This  act  also  created  the  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  (FDIC)  and 
converted the OMPC into the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) with all 12 Reserve 
banks as members (p. 431). As discussed in section 3.4 above, Carter Glass, Chairman of the 
Senate Banking Committee, based on the statements by Adolph Miller and others at the hearings 
held  in  1931,  held  that  the  New  York  Fed  had  too  much  power.  Miller  blamed  Benjamin 
Strong’s  loose  monetary  policy  in  1927  to  aid  the  British,  for  fueling  the  Wall  St.  boom. 
Consequently, the 1933 Act transferred the power of the Reserve Banks to conduct exchange 
market policy to the Board (Meltzer p. 433). 
Marinner  Eccles,  appointed  Chairman  of  the  system  in  January  1934,  was  a  strong 
advocate for centralized control. He and his brilliant advisor Lauchlin Currie helped draft the 
legislation that led to the 1935 Act. Meltzer (pp. 470-486) describes the process leading to its   39 
passage. Eccles, was an early Keynesian who believed that fiscal policy was the principal means 
to stabilize the macro economy. Using the traditional tools of monetary policy was like “pushing 
on a string. Administrative controls (margin requirements, credit controls, ceiling interest rates) 
should be used aggressively by the Fed to supplement fiscal policy (Meltzer pp. 467-470).  
The  1935  Banking  Act  radically  changed  the  Fed.  The  Board  of  Governors  in 
Washington  now  had  the  majority  of  votes  on  the  FOMC  (the  committee  consisted  of  7 
governors of the Board and 5 Reserve bank Presidents). The Secretary of the Treasury and the 
Comptroller of the Currency were removed from the Board. The influence of  real bills was 
diluted by adding “with regard to the general credit situation of the country” to ‘accommodating 
commerce and business’; and the Board gained the power to change reserve requirements up to 
twice the prevailing ratio by majority rule (p. 488). 
Meltzer (p. 575) points out the irony that once the Banking Act of 1935 made the Federal 
Reserve  a  full  fledged  central  bank  with  power  centralized  in  Washington,  conferring 
independence within the government, the Fed lost effective control to the Treasury for the next 
16  years.  He  describes  (pp.442-463)  how  FDR  and  Morgenthau  orchestrated  the  Treasury’s 
policies to reflate the U.S. economy from 1933 to 1941, with the Fed playing a very subservient 
role.  In  1933  the  Fed  was  pressured  (against  Harrison’s  judgment  because  member  bank 
borrowing was low) into expansionary monetary policy by the threat that the Congress would 
issue greenbacks under the Thomas Amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of April 
1933.  
The  key  reflationary  policy  initiatives  that  effectively  extricated  the  U.S.  from  the 
depression were produced by the Treasury not the Federal Reserve. After taking the U.S. off the 
gold standard on April 11, 1933, Morgenthau initiated a gold buying policy to raise the price of   40 
gold and, in accordance with the theories of George Warren, thereby raise commodity prices. 
Meltzer  documents  the  limited  impact  of  the  policy  on  prices  until  January  31,  1934  when 
Roosevelt officially devalued the dollar by close to 60% thereby making a clear commitment to 
pursue domestic rather than international policy goals.  
Most Federal Reserve officials would have preferred that the U.S. return to the gold 
standard and, in addition in accordance with the Europeans at the June 1933 London monetary 
conference,  a  coordinated  stabilization  of  the  dollar-sterling  and  dollar-franc  exchange  rates. 
Meltzer (p. 550) points out that such a solution would not have addressed the basic international 
monetary  issue  that  the  real  exchange  rates  between  the  U.S.,  England  and  France  were 
drastically misaligned. The new U.S. gold price of $35.00 attracted a flood of gold from the rest 
of the world, that was not sterilized, fueling an increase in the monetary base and rising prices.  
Some of the proceeds of the devaluation were used to create the Exchange Stabilization 
Fund,  designed  to  mimic  the  British  Exchange  Equalization  Account  of  1932,  to  conduct 
exchange market intervention. The legislation creating the ESF gave the Treasury the power to 
use it for domestic monetary policy purposes, thus, like the Thomas Amendment, according to 
Meltzer serving as a possible threat to the Federal Reserve’s monetary powers. 
The key event for the Federal Reserve in the second half of the decade was the decision 
by Eccles and the Board to double reserve requirements in three steps in 1936-37 beginning in 
July 1936. Meltzer (pp. 490 – 521) beautifully describes the discussion in the FOMC and with 
Treasury leading to these actions as motivated by the concerns that commercial bank growing 
excess reserves would fuel inflation, inevitably leading to deflation and recession. According to 
him (p. 495) the Fed never gave up the Burgess-Riefler doctrine but now began treating excess   41 
reserves as negative member borrowings. The system never explained the reason for the excess 
reserves but labeled them “as a redundant surplus.”  
The  increase  in  reserve  requirements  coincided  with  the  decision  by  the  Treasury  in 
December 1936, also concerned about inflationary pressure, to sterilize the massive gold inflows 
into the U.S. Both policies were contractionary, leading to the recession of May 1937 to April 
1938,  the  third  deepest in  the  twentieth  century.  Meltzer  follows  Friedman  and  Schwartz  in 
attributing  the  policy  mistake  to  the  failure  to  recognize  the  precautionary  nature  of  excess 
reserves. He documents (p. 530) the system’s unwillingness to take stimulative action once the 
recession was underway because on Burgess-Riefler guidelines, since nominal interest rates were 
low, money must be easy. In the end, recovery was fueled by Treasury actions in the spring of 
1938 desterilizing gold purchases (opposed by Eccles because they could be inflationary) and by 
stimulative fiscal policy (p. 531). Following this episode, until the outbreak of World War II, the 
system primarily operated a passive low interest “easy money” policy under the effective control 
of the Treasury.  
In  chapter  6  (pp.  534  –  535)  Meltzer  documents  the  Treasury’s  major  foray  into 
international policy coordination under the Tripartite Agreement of October 1936 with Britain 
and France. The agreement designed to create a smooth adjustment to the devaluation of the 
French franc, required the Treasuries of the three countries to coordinate daily operations in the 
foreign exchange market. Ultimately the agreement collapsed in 1938 because France followed 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies inconsistent with the agreed upon pegs.  
More  fundamentally  (p.  544),  Meltzer  criticizes  Tripartite  (and  its  modern  advocates 
Kindleberger(1986) and Eichengreen (1992)) as based on two fundamental flaws : the failure to 
distinguish real from nominal exchange rate movements; and that international cooperation is not   42 
a viable substitute for adjustment of a floating exchange rate regime. Although Tripartite was a 
failure in economic terms, Meltzer believes was successful as a political statement in unifying 
the western democracies against the looming fascist threat. 
 
3.6. The 1940’s 
 
From  1941  to  1951,  the  Federal  Reserve  was  completely  subservient  to  the  debt 
management  policies  of  the  Treasury.  In  the  late  1930’s  the  Fed  kept  interest  rates  low  to 
facilitate the funding of the Treasury’s debt. In April 1942, once World War II was under way, 
the System adopted an explicit peg for 90 day T-Bills at 0.375% and for the 25-year bond at 
2.5%. Meltzer (chapter 7) describes how the Fed became an engine of inflation, initially by 
lending to commercial banks on the collateral of government securities at a preferred rate below 
the official peg; and later by directly purchasing Treasury securities. Problems arose because 
rates were pegged at all maturities, leading commercial banks to sell low-interest T-bills to the 
Fed and then buy higher yielding long term bonds for their portfolios, with the Fed absorbing 
most of the short term debt (p. 596). 
Chairman Eccles was a strong advocate of the wartime bond pegging policy and was not 
concerned about the impotence of monetary policy, because as mentioned in section 3.5 above, 
he believed that monetary policy was limited anyway. He continually pushed for an extension of 
the Federal Reserves’ mandate to control credit and expenditure to aid the war effort. Although 
the  Fed  was  an  engine  of  inflation,  inflation  remained  relatively  low  during  World  War  II 
compared to World War  I  and the Civil War experiences reflecting the greater use of bond 
finance and the effectiveness of price controls.   43 
After the war ended, the interest-rate-pegging policy was retained as were many of the 
ponoply of controls, with the exception of price controls. Officials at the Fed acquiesced to the 
peg and expansionary policy because of a widespread belief, fostered by Keynesian doctrine and 
the experience following World War I, that postwar there would be a serious recession. Also, as 
after World War I, Fed and Treasury officials were concerned over capital losses to bondholders, 
should rates be allowed to rise. As it turned out, with the exception of a sharp recession right 
after the war and a milder one in 1948-49, the U.S. economy boomed. Moreover, Meltzer (pp. 
629-635) points out that despite the peg, inflation, money growth and market yields remained 
low  throughout  the  late  1940’s.  This  did  not  reflect  Fed  policy,  but  occurred  because  the 
Treasury used its surplus to retire debt. Indeed, he argues (p. 650) that inflation expectations 
remained quite low throughout this period owing to these factors and continued belief in the gold 
standard as a nominal anchor under the 1944 Bretton Woods system.  
  Despite  the  relatively  sanguine  environment,  some  Fed  officials,  concerned  about 
inflation,  pressed  for  the  institutional  independence  to  raise  rates.  One  of  the  strongest  and 
earliest advocates was Allan Sproul, President of the New York Fed. He was initially opposed by 
Eccles and later by Eccles’ successor Thomas McCabe, on the grounds that it would take a large 
increase in rates to be effective, which would not “be consistent with the maintenance of stable 
conditions in the government securities markets” (Eccles is quoted on p. 633). The need for 
flexibility in monetary policy became apparent in the recession of 1948-49. The Fed was slow to 
react to it. It reduced reserve requirements (the principal tool of monetary policy in use then (p. 
678)) but with little impact. Recovery was largely precipitated by falling prices raising real cash 
balances (p. 679).     44 
  In one of the most fascinating discussions in the book, Meltzer documents in great detail 
the events that led to the Accord of March 1951 which ended the Treasury’s control over the 
Federal Reserve. The key events in the saga were the Congressional hearings led by Senator Paul 
Douglas in the fall of 1949 (pp. 688-690). At these hearings: John Snyder, Secretary of the 
Treasury, made the case for interest rate stability to aid in debt management; Sproul made the 
case  in  favor  of  changing  interest  rates  to  influence  expectations;  McCabe  supported  the 
Treasury’s  view;  Eccles  changed  his  earlier  views  to  favor  Federal  Reserve  independence; 
Burgess of New York made the case that discount rate policy was a sufficiently powerful tool for 
monetary control. The subsequent report backing up the views of Sproul and Burgess was a 
victory for the Fed. 
  From then on the conflict between the Fed and the Treasury over raising rates to deal 
with the inflationary pressures at the start of the Korean War deepened (pp. 691-712). In January 
1951 at a meeting held in the White House between key Fed and Treasury officials, the Treasury 
argued for bond market stability, while the Fed urged raising rates to stem inflation. After the 
meeting Snyder gave a speech stating that the Fed fully agreed to continue supporting bond 
prices. This infuriated McCabe and other Fed officials. The New York Times and the financial 
press supported the Fed, as did Douglas.  
President  Truman  then  invited  the  members  of the  FOMC  to  the White  House for a 
meeting on January 31, 1951 where “he discussed the importance of maintaining confidence in 
government securities” (p. 763). Subsequently a letter from Truman indicated that the Fed would 
continue to support long-term rates. The FOMC disagreed. In letters on February 5 to Truman 
and Snyder the FOMC stated that to the contrary it favored control of rates to stem inflation. 
Intense negotiation between Fed officials and the Treasury under Assistant Secretary William   45 
McChesney Martin, culminated in another meeting on February 26 at the White House which led 
to the famous Accord. “The Treasury and the Federal Reserve System have reached full accord 
with respect to debt management and monetary policy to be pursued in furthering their common 
purpose to assure the successful financing of the government’s requirements and, at the same 
time, to minimize monetization of the public debt” (quoted on p. 711). According to Meltzer, the 
Accord gave the Federal Reserve the independence to conduct its own interest rate policy. Soon 
thereafter the Fed reverted to its Burgess-Reifler roots, focusing on net free reserves and short-
term market rates (p. 721). 
  The Fed took so long to regain its independence, according to Meltzer (p. 715), because 
Eccles’ basic belief in the ineffectiveness of monetary policy. Once he was replaced by McCabe 
in 1949 (who lacked Eccles leadership abilities), Sproul was able to take charge of events and 
lead the charge to independence.  
A final theme treated in chapter 7 by Meltzer, was the Bretton Woods agreement of July 
1944 that led to the creation of the IMF, the World Bank and the adjustable peg international 
monetary  system.  The  U.S.  and  British  Treasuries  negotiated  the  Articles  of  Agreement  at 
Bretton Woods. 
  Meltzer’s  contribution  to  the  Bretton  Woods  story  (see  earlier  accounts  by  Meltzer 
(1991), Bordo (1993) and James (1996)) is to document the lack of influence that the Board of 
Governors had in shaping the U.S. plan drafted by Henry Dexter White of the Treasury, and in 
the deliberations at Bretton Woods. While the Board in Washington was in agreement with the 
Treasury  on  the  Articles,  the  New  York  Fed  and  especially  John  Williams  were  markedly 
opposed. Williams correctly worried that the U.S. was the only country (other than Costa Rica) 
under  the  “scarce  currency  clause”  of  the  Bretton  Woods  Articles  with  a  convertible  hard   46 
currency. Once exchange controls were lifted, the U.S. would have to provide unlimited liquidity 
to the rest of the world. He also was concerned (presciently so) that Britain, the other reserve 
currency, was too weak to become convertible, and, once it did, would end up with a crisis and 
devaluation,  as  occurred  in  1947  and  1949.  Instead  of  the  Bretton  Woods  adjustable  peg, 
Williams advocated a key currency system (based on the gold standard that would operate like 
the Tripartite agreement of 1936). The key reserve countries, the U.S., Britain and France would 
adhere to gold pegs and the other countries would eventually peg to them (Bordo 1993). As it 
turned out, the Bretton Woods system, under which the members would peg their currencies to 
the dollar and the dollar was pegged to gold at $35.00 per ounce evolved, after current account 
convertibility was declared by the European countries in 1958, into the gold dollar standard. The 















   47 
References 
 
Walter Bagehot (1962) [1873], Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market. Reprint, 
Homewood, Ill. Richard D. Irwin.  
 
Ben S. Bernanke (1983), “Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the 
Great Depression.” American Economic Review 73 (June), 257-76. 
 
Michael D. Bordo and Ronald MacDonald (2004), “Interest Rate Interaction in the Classical 
Gold  Standard;  1880-1914:  Was  There  Monetary  Independence?”  Journal  of  Monetary 
Economics Vol. 52, pp. 307-377. 
 
Michael D. Bordo, Ehsan Choudhri and Anna Schwartz (2002), “Was Expansionary Monetary 
policy Feasible During the Great Depression?” Explorations in Economic History. January. 
 
Michael D. Bordo (1993), “The Bretton Woods International Monetary System: A Historical 
Over view” in Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen (eds.) A Retrospective on the Bretton 
Woods System. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.  
 
Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer (1993), Money and the Economy: Issues in Monetary 
Analysis. Cambridge University Press for the Raffaele Mattioli Foundation. 
 
Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer (1968), “What did we learn from the monetary experiences 
of the United States in the Great Depression?” Canadian Journal of Economics 1, 334-48. 
 
Charles Calomiris (1993), “Financial Factors in the Great Depression.” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 7 (spring), 61-85. 
 
Lester Chandler (1958), Benjamin Strong Central Banker. Washington D.C., Brookings 
Institution.  
   48 
Sir John Clapham (1944), The Bank of England: A History. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press.  
 
Barry Eichengreen (1992), Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-
1939. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Frank W. Fetter (1965), The Development of British Monetary Orthodoxy 1717-1875. 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press.   
 
Irving Fisher (1930), The Theory of Interest. New York, Macmillan. Reprint New York, A.M. 
Kelley. 
 
Irving Fisher (1896), “Appreciation and Interest.” Publications of the American Economic 
Association 9 (4), 331-447. 
 
Milton Friedman (1956), Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money. Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press.  
 
Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz (1963), A Monetary History of the United States: 1867-
1960. Princeton, Princeton University Press.   
 
James Hamilton (1987), “Monetary Factors in the Great Depression.” Journal of Monetary 
Economics 19, 145-69.  
 
Bray Hammond (1957), Banks and Politics in America. Princeton. Princeton University Press. 
 
Chang-Tao  Hsieh  and  Christina  Romer  (2001),  “Was  the  Federal  Reserve  Fettered?” 
Devaluation Expectations in the 1932 Monetary Expansion.” NBER Working Paper No. 8113. 
 
Charles  Kindleberger  (1986),  The  World  in  Depression,  1929-1939.  Revised  Berkeley, 
University of California Press.    49 
 
Jane  Knodell  (2003),  “Profit  and  Duty  in  the  Second  Bank  of  the  United  States’  Exchange 
Operations.” Financial History Review 10, 5-30. 
 
Paul  Krugman  (1991),  “Target  Zone  and  Exchange  Rate  Dynamics.”  Quarterly  Journal  of 
Economics CUI (3) pp. 669-682.   
 
Robert Lucas Jr. (1994), “Review of Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz’s, ‘A Monetary 
History of the United States: 1867-1960’” Journal of Monetary Economics Vol. 34, No. 1 
(August) pp. 5-16. 
 
Allan H. Meltzer (2003), A History of the Federal Reserve, Volume I: 1913-1951. Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press.  
 
Allan Meltzer (1976), “Monetary and Other Explanations of the Start of the Great Depression.” 
Journal of Monetary Economics 2, 455-72. 
 
Jeffery A. Miron (1994), “Empirical Methodology in Macroeconomics: Explaining the Success 
of Friedman and Schwartz’s, ‘A Monetary History of the United States: 1867-1960’” Journal of 
Monetary Economics Vol. 34, No. 1 (August) pp. 17-25. 
 
Fritz Redlich (1951), The Molding of American Banking: Man and Ideas. New York: Hafner 
Publishers. 
 
Christina Romer and David Romer (1989), “Does Monetary Policy Matter? A new Test in the 
Spirit of Friedman and Schwartz.” NBER Macroeconomic Annual, 4, 121-170. 
 
Richard  S.  Sayers  (1976),  Bank  of  England  Operations  1891-1944.  Vol  I.    Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
   50 
Anna Schwartz (1986), “ Real and Pseudo Financial Crises.” In Forrest Capie and ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ !"￿￿
￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿%%!& ￿ ￿’￿ ￿￿￿￿(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿)￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿*￿+ ￿,￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
--￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿./ ￿%%￿￿
￿
0￿￿ ￿￿￿1￿￿ ￿ ￿￿$ ￿%2%& ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿3￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ 5 1￿0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
)￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿1￿ ￿ 4￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿$ ￿%/2& ￿ ￿1￿￿￿6 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿7￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ 4￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿8￿￿#￿￿￿￿7￿￿ #￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿0￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
 
Henry Thornton (1962) [1802], An Inquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit of 
Great Britain. Reprint, New York, Kelley.  
 
Jacob Viner (1965) [1937], Studies in the Theory of International Trade. Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press. Reprint New York, Kelley. 
 
Richard C. West (1977), Banking Reform and the Federal Reserve, 1863-1923. Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press.  
 
David C. Wheelock (1991), The Strategy and Consistency of Federal Reserve Monetary Policy 
1929-1933. New York, Cambridge University Press.  
 
Elmur Wicker (1965), “Federal Reserve Monetary Policy, 1922-33: A Reinterpretation.” Journal 
of Political Economy 73 (August), 325-43. 
 
Elmur Wicker (1966), Federal Reserve Monetary Policy, 1917-1933. New York, Random House.  
 
Elmer Wood (1939), English Theories of Central Banking Control, 1819-1858. Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press.   
    